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ABSTRACT
This study examines the impact of institutional quality on foreign 
direct investment (F.D.I.) by categorising the countries as developed 
or developing. We measured institutional quality by the sum of 
control of corruption and rule of law indicators. We provide evidence 
that institutional quality positively and significantly impacts F.D.I. 
in developed countries; specifically, we find that a one standard 
deviation change in governance significantly affects F.D.I. by a 
factor of 0.2225 (using common law and the lagged values of the 
independent variables as instruments). Ceteris paribus, the results for 
the developing countries demonstrate that the institutional quality 
impact is insignificant because of the weak structure of institutions. 
Result findings strongly support the significance of governance 
indicators in attracting F.D.I. inflows. From our results, we infer that 
the relevance of governance indicators tends to be a key point in 
attracting F.D.I. inflows.
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (F.D.I.), a key factor of globalisation, is an important stimulator 
of productivity enhancement, technological advancement, and job creation. As a result, 
F.D.I. accelerates economic growth, playing a vital role in tax revenue, foreign exchange, 
and development gaps in developing and transition economies (Quazi, 2007; Smith, 1997). 
In addition, the average rate of growth of real gross domestic product (G.D.P.) in the period 
2005–2012 was 1.2% for developed countries, 4.3% for transition economies, and 6.1% 
for developing countries; in 2013, the partially estimated results were 1.0% for developed 
countries, 2.0% for transition economies, and 4.6% for developing countries (UN, 2014). In 
addition, the total trade of goods and services in the period 2002–2012 fluctuated unevenly.
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 broke the upward G.D.P. trend in both developed and 
developing countries. These trends highlighted the vulnerability of developing countries, 
which were directly influenced by the economic activities in developed countries (UN, 
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2013). Financial crises expose weaknesses in institutional quality that may have been hid-
den during a boom period. For instance, in the after effects of the Asian financial crises in 
1997, many countries identified governance weaknesses and tried to reform institutional 
policies in order to attract more F.D.I. Moreover, the Global Vulnerability Monitor provided 
a decomposition analysis to measure the size of trade shocks relative to world G.D.P.: the 
impact of trade shocks was 1.9% during the boom period of 2004–2007, the financial crisis 
provided a negative shock (–2.7%) in 2009, and trade shock impact was 2.5% in 2010–2011 
(UN, 2014). Also, the ascending trend of real F.D.I. inflows was interrupted as a consequence 
of the financial crisis, with a higher impact on developed countries (Figure 1).
Existing literature on the impact of institutional quality has described different ways in which 
institutions affect F.D.I. Three important factors have increased the importance of the relationship 
between F.D.I. and institutions. First, North (1990) highlights the importance of institutions 
in boosting investment and economic development. Second, with the strong growth in F.D.I. 
inflows during the last two decades, transitioning and developed nations are interested in insti-
tutional reforms in order to attract more F.D.I. Third, foreign investors are showing more interest 
Figure 1. trends in real F.D.i. inflows (2002–2012). source: World Development indicators (W.D.i.) 2013 
database.
notes: Real F.D.i. net inflows, using 2002 as the base year.
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in institutional quality when determining in which country to invest (Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 
2004). Buchanan et al. (2012) explained that poor institutions act like tax, which is, together 
with increased uncertainty, associated with F.D.I. Generally speaking, strong institutions attract 
F.D.I. and poor institutions deter F.D.I. (Ali, Fiess, & MacDonald, 2010).
Furthermore, many previous papers and findings have researched the impact of insti-
tutional quality on F.D.I. in developing and transition economies. To our knowledge, no 
previous research studies have measured the impact of institutional quality on F.D.I. inflows 
by categorising the countries as developed or developing countries. Consequently, we bridge 
this shortcoming in the literature by categorising the countries as developed or develop-
ing to more accurately measure the importance of institutions in attracting F.D.I. inflows. 
Accordingly, this paper adds to the existing literature by addressing the following questions:
(1)  Are institutions, as a determinant of F.D.I., equally important for both developed 
and developing countries?
(2)  What is the importance of institutions, relative to other determinants of F.D.I.?
Moreover, previous findings on F.D.I. were obtained using cross-country studies. 
Consequently, we selected a large number of countries, employing a panel data-set that 
includes 110 countries in the 11-year timespan of 2002 to 2012.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we define the literature review and high-
light the importance of institutional quality. In section 3, we briefly explain the data and 
the research methodology used in carrying out this study, and in section 4 we focus on the 
analysis of the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
Recent studies have focused keenly on the impact of institutional quality on F.D.I. (Ali 
et al., 2010; Buchanan et al., 2012; Wei, 1997). The dominant view is that countries with good 
governance can attract more F.D.I. (Gani, 2007; Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Globerman, 
Shapiro, & Tang, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; The World 
Bank Group, 2002), whereas an environment of weak governance cannot protect the invest-
ments (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). Institutional variables, specifically corruption, political 
restrictions, and protection of property rights, are some important determinants of multi-
national investments and F.D.I. inflows (Henisz, 1998; Jensen, 2003; Richards & Nwankwo, 
2005; Wei, 2000). Staats and Biglaiser (2012) argue that panel data analysis indicates that 
rule of law and judicial strength are important determinants of F.D.I. inflows in 17 Latin 
American countries.
Further, some scholars argue that in countries where property rights are poorly protected, 
multinationals’ investments face expropriation risks (Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Williamson, 
1999). For instance, a host country government may appropriate some of the returns of 
multinationals or even nationalise them. Jiménez (2010) argues that Spanish multinationals, 
particularly younger ones, implement their internationalisation policies by investing in 
countries where political risk levels are very different, aiming to achieve maximum benefit 
by acquiring the knowledge and access to managerial talent, as well as diversifying their 
F.D.I. portfolios, to minimise risk against local fluctuations in supply and demand; thus 
positional advantages can be achieved by investing in countries where political capabilities 
can be used to gain economic benefits and healthy effects. Greater assurances to comply with 
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contracts, respect for property rights, and economic freedom are important determinants 
to attract more foreign investment (Kapuria-Foreman, 2007).
Furthermore, Dunning (2002) argued that institutional factors, such as good governance 
and economic freedom, are becoming highly popular determinants of F.D.I. as the priorities 
of multinational companies (M.N.C.s) are shifting from market and resource seeking to 
efficiency seeking. Traditional F.D.I. determinants, such as natural resources and low labour 
costs, are relatively becoming less important, while less traditional factors, such as govern-
ance and economic freedom, are becoming more popular (Addison & Heshmati, 2003; 
Becchetti & Hasan, 2004; Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 2001). 
Ali et al. (2010) concluded that property rights were more important determinants of F.D.I.; 
specifically that other institutional factors affect F.D.I. indirectly through property rights.
Law and order become a serious issue for M.N.C.s when courts fail to enforce contracts 
and when the government influences court decisions for political motives (Drabek & Payne, 
2002). Law and order instability leads to corruption (Johnson & Dahlström, 2004). Many 
investor surveys also suggest that one of the most important institutional factors that deters 
F.D.I. inflows is corruption (Asiedu & Villamil, 2000; Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; 
Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998; Wei, 2000). In general, countries that are more 
corrupt receive fewer F.D.I. inflows. Lower corruption index scores in the host country 
have positive associations with investment inflows, as perceived corruption levels would 
be lower (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Wei, 2000).
On the other hand, institutional quality is associated with economic growth (North, 
1981, 1990). Previous research studies on the important determinants of F.D.I. in develop-
ing countries have argued that institutional quality is the most important factor in stimu-
lating economic growth. North (1990) explains that institutions are formulated to reduce 
the uncertainty associated with human exchange and provide societies with a predictable 
framework for interaction. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) found that the returns for good 
governance are strong for developing economies, relative to other countries in their sample. 
The view that economic problems in developing countries arise due to the poor quality of 
institutions is very common among researchers and policymakers; lower institutional quality 
is associated with lower investment, low productivity growth, low per capita income, and 
overall slower output growth (Jude & Levieuge, 2013).
Good institutions reduce production and transaction costs (North, 1990), and as a result, 
increase profitability and economic activity, whereas poor and weak institutions increase 
uncertainty and costs of production (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008). North (1990) illustrates 
that parties at the opposite ends of an economic activity have incomplete information 
about their counterparts’ true intentions; who might cheat or deceive others. Due to the 
lack of information and uncertainty associated with economic transactions, transaction 
costs contain a risk premium. North (1990) argues that the risk premium is a function of 
institutional quality, as it depends upon property right protection, contract enforceability, 
and the likelihood of default by the other party.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
In our research study, we estimated the impact of institutional quality on F.D.I. using a panel 
data-set of 110 countries with annual data over the period 2002–2012. The choice of the time 
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span and number of countries in this article were contingent upon the availability of data on 
all the variables and countries included in the model. Further, we separated the countries 
into 41 developed (we include here developed countries and transitioning economies) and 
69 developing (we include here developing countries, least-developed countries, and small 
island developing states) according to the criteria given in the World Economic Situation and 
Prospects 2014, published by the United Nations (Appendix 1(a) and 1(b)). Data for all our 
macroeconomic variables and governance are taken from the World Development Indicators 
(The World Bank Group, 2013) and from World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2007), respectively.
In our analysis, we use two indicators to represent governance: control of corruption 
(C.C.) and rule of law (R.L.). C.C. reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. This governance variable ranges from 
–2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). The R.L. index measures the extent to which agents have confi-
dence in and follow the R.L., specifically the quality of contract and enforcement, property 
rights, the courts, and the police and the likelihood of crime and violence. R.L. can range 
from –2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). Mauro (1995) argues that there may be good reasons to 
have positive correlations between the variables; however, from an econometric point of 
view, high correlation between the variables can cause multicollinearity and might reduce 
the extent to which the relevance of each individual governance indicator can be meas-
ured. Daude and Stein (2007) note that the standard solution is to group the variables into 
one aggregate component that captures similar dimensions. Therefore, we summed up the 
weighted average index of the individual governance indicators (C.C.+R.L.) as an aggregate 
governance component (Gov).
Moosa and Cardak (2006) argue that researchers searching for F.D.I. determinants often 
report the most interesting results to suit their specific research aims. Analysing F.D.I. 
inflows from southern European countries to north African countries and new European 
Union member states, Jiménez (2011) concludes that a good and sound macroeconomic 
environment, human capital, and quality infrastructure attract F.D.I. inflows. Similarly, using 
data for 1970–2005, Oladipo (2010) found that market size, human capital, infrastructure, 
and macroeconomic stability are the most important determinants of F.D.I. inflows, whereas 
Singh and Jun (1995), from a panel of developing countries, found that market size, political 
risk, and economic growth significantly determine variations in F.D.I. inflows as a share of 
G.D.P. Market size is generally measured using G.D.P., G.D.P. per capita, and the size of the 
population; it is expected to be a positive and significant determinant of F.D.I. flows (Durán, 
1999; Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, & Zettelmeyer, 2002; Lankes & Venables, 1996; Nunes Amaral 
& Guimera, 2006; Resmini, 2000).
Further, other scholars argue that infrastructure significantly and positively impacts F.D.I. 
inflows in developing economies (Asiedu, 2006; Khadaroo & Seetanah, 2010). In relation 
to developed countries, Bae (2008) notes that infrastructure is not only a stimulator, but 
also a good indicator of boosted F.D.I. inflows.
On the basis of previous research findings, we conclude that G.D.P. per capita growth 
(G.D.P.P.C.G.), population (Pop) as a proxy for market size (Billington, 1999), and the 
number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants as a proxy for infrastructure (Tele) in the 
host country (Moosa & Cardak, 2006) are some of the most significant variables for F.D.I. 
We have included World Trade Organization membership (W.T.O.) to measure the impact 
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of geographical forces on F.D.I. As the time span 2002–2012 includes financial crises which 
hit hardest in the years 2008 and 2009, in order to capture the unobservable temporal effect 
of this crises, we define Financial Crisis as being the year dummy variable where the years 
of crises are getting the value 1 while for the non-financial crises years are assigned the 
value 0. In our model, we have also included one-year lag (Lagged F.D.I.) with respect to 
the dependent variable in order to take in to account the time needed for F.D.I. inflows to 
react to Lagged F.D.I. (Bevan et al., 2004).
Table 1(a) shows the descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables in 
developed countries while Table 1(b) presents the same for developing countries. Table 
2(a) and 2(b) report the results for the correlation matrixes and the variance inflation 
factors (V.I.F.s) for developed and developing countries, respectively. A general rule is that 
the V.I.F. should not exceed 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 2005); V.I.F. values that exceed 10 
are generally viewed as evidence of multicollinearity (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). Given that 
all values are under the strictest limit of 10, it is confirmed that no serious correlation and 
multicollinearity problem exists in our data.
The G.D.P. deflator is a price index used to measure inflation in an economy and is 
calculated as the ratio of nominal G.D.P. to real G.D.P. in a given year (multiplied by 100) 
(Dornbusch, Fischer, & Kearney, 1995; McTaggart, Findlay, & Parkin, 1996). In this paper, 
we considered the G.D.P. deflator, using 2002 as the base year for all our countries.1 The 
main criterion for the selection of the base year is that it should be normal or average and 
not subject to any major economic change.2 F.D.I. is measured as net inflows (B.o.P. current 
U.S.$). The real F.D.I. inflows are calculated by dividing the net F.D.I. inflows (B.o.P. current 
U.S.$) by the G.D.P. deflator 2002 to remove inflation from the nominal value terms.
3.2 Methodology
According to previous research studies and the existing academic literature that measured 
the impact of institutional quality on F.D.I. inflows, the evidence regarding F.D.I. remains 
mixed. The inconclusive evidence has been attributed to methodological and measurement 
problems (Ali et al., 2010).
Table 1(a). Descriptive statistics – developed countries.
notes: the table summarises the descriptive statistics for the major variables in this study for developed countries. F.D.i. is 
measured as net inflows (B.o.P. current U.s.$) divided by the G.D.P. deflator, with 2002 as the base year. G.D.P.P.c.G. – G.D.P. 
per capita (annual %) – indicates economic growth and the standard of living. tele– number of telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants – is used as a proxy for the quality of the infrastructure in the host country. Pop – is the proxy to measure 
market size. Lagged F.D.i. is used as an explanatory variable to measure the effect of the previous year’s investment on the 
current F.D.i. inflows, whereas W.t.o. and Financial crisis are dummy variables.
source: World Bank, World Development indicators (W.D.i.) 2013 database.





mean 9.6016 1.4717 2.7022 1.5257 7.0388 9.612 0.6341 0.1822
maximum 11.4729 4.5333 38.0572 1.8707 8.4969 11.4729 1 1
minimum 6.6397 −2.5684 −14.4209 0.5774 5.4586 6.6397 0 0
std. dev. 0.9114 2.3151 4.9007 0.2605 0.6263 0.9175 0.4822 0.3864
no. of obs. 451 451 451 451 451 410 451 451
no. of countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
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We estimate the following model, which describes the determinants of F.D.I.:
 
(1)
















Table 1(b). Descriptive statistics – developing countries.
notes: the table summarises the descriptive statistics for the major variables in this study for developing countries. F.D.i. is 
measured as net inflows (B.o.P. current U.s.$) divided by the G.D.P. deflator, with 2002 as the base year. G.D.P.P.c.G. – G.D.P. 
per capita (annual %) – indicates economic growth and the standard of living. tele– number of telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants – is used as a proxy for the quality of the infrastructure in the host country. Pop – is the proxy to measure 
market size. Lagged F.D.i. is used as an explanatory variable to measure the effect of the previous year’s investment on the 
current F.D.i. inflows, whereas W.t.o. and Financial crisis are dummy variables.
source: World Bank, World Development indicators 2013 (W.D.i.) database.





mean 8.6384 −0.3766 3.0612 0.8046 6.9186 8.6245 0.7826 0.1818
maximum 11.2514 4.1485 30.344 1.792 9.1303 11.2514 1 1
minimum 1.0311 −3.7009 −13.2641 −0.7756 4.8438 1.0311 0 0
std. dev. 1.0471 1.5134 3.8349 0.6371 0.9885 1.0525 0.4127 0.3859
no. of obs. 759 759 759 759 759 690 759 759
no. of countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
Table 2(a). correlation matrix and variance inflation Factors (v.i.F.s) – developed countries.
source: author calculation.






Gov 0.6011 1 6.55
G.D.P.P.c.G. −0.2507 −0.4169 1 1.47
tele 0.6145 0.7556 −0.3656 1 2.64
Pop 0.5229 −0.0064 −0.0864 0.1732 1 2.09
Lagged 
F.D.i.
0.8903 0.5968 −0.3339 0.6086 0.5294 1 3.09
W.t.o. 0.6532 0.8461 −0.4319 0.6578 0.2366 0.6477 1 4.6
Financial 
crises
0.0328 0.0006 −0.3443 −0.0067 0.0018 0.1521 −0.0016 1 1.26
Table 2(b). correlation matrix and variance inflation Factors (v.i.F.s) – developing countries.
source: author calculation.






Gov 0.2195 1 2.55
G.D.P.P.c.G. 0.2761 0.0262 1 1.18
tele 0.4268 0.6747 0.0296 1 2.5
Pop 0.5478 −0.4739 0.1954 −0.2733 1 3.23
Lagged 
F.D.i.
0.947 0.2188 0.2258 0.4281 0.5262 1 3.14
W.t.o. −0.0146 0.055 −0.1362 −0.0721 0.0234 −0.0216 1 1.06
Financial 
crises
0.0372 0.0019 −0.2413 0.0192 0.0036 0.0972 0 1 1.1
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The differences in the legal protection of investors provided by destination countries might 
help in understanding why firms are financed and owned so differently. Buchanan and 
English (2007) argue that investors seeking to gain benefits from market returns must 
choose their investments on the basis of the legal foundations of the countries in which 
they invest. La Porta et al. developed a relationship between financial markets and the legal 
environment known as L.L.S.V., in which the origin of the legal code is an important deter-
minant of governance and financial markets, attracting F.D.I. through secure property rights 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 2000; La Porta et al., 1998).
David and Brierley (1985) state that legal foundations can be categorised into different 
families, i.e., English, French, Scandinavian, or German, and two primary legal systems, 
i.e., civil or common. The same classification is also applied by Shleifer, Vishny, La Porta, 
and Lopez-de-Silanes (2000). Legal codes are classified according to their origin as follows: 
English (ENGLAW), French (FRELAW), Scandinavian (SCANLAW), German (GERLAW), 
and Socialist (SOCLAW). Socialist law has the disadvantage that all formerly communist 
countries are included in this category, and so the role of the legal system may be vitiated 
by other factors (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).
Using instrumental variable (I.V.) methodology, in our first model, I.V.a, we therefore 
measure governance using the data-set ‘The Quality of Government’ (La Porta, Lopez- 
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999), but exclude the SOCLAW category. For I.V.b, we con-
sidered common law using data from the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa3 and 
lagged values of the independent variables. Pure common law has its origins in English law. 
Civil law derives from Roman law and applies to all those countries with their legal origins 
in French, German, and Scandinavian law. French, German, and common law (English) 
have spread around the world through all kinds of combinations of conquest, imperialism, 
and other means. Civil law gives investors weaker legal rights and a lower quality of law 
enforcement, with French civil law providing the least protection. German and Scandinavian 
civil law provide the highest quality of law enforcement, but an average degree of protection. 
Common law (English origin) provides the next highest quality of law enforcement and 
also the highest protection (La Porta et al., 1998).
In the I.V.a model, we consider all four legal origin instruments (legor_uk, legor_fr, 
legor_ge, and legor_sc). The results for developed countries were highly significant for all 
four instruments; for the developing countries, only three instruments were highly signif-
icant, with the Scandinavian origin being omitted due to collinearity. For this reason, we 
took into account only three legal origin instruments (legor_uk, legor_fr, and legor_ge) for 
both developed and developing countries.
4. Results
4.1. Developed countries
In Table 3(a), we report the ordinary least squares (O.L.S.) regression results, with F.D.I. 
as the dependent variable in column (1). Governance has a positive and significant impact 
on F.D.I. because of the stability of the R.L., political stability, and effective C.C. in devel-
oped economies. Therefore, there is a significant and positive association between F.D.I. 
and governance. The coefficient of G.D.P.P.C.G. is significant and positive. The statistical 
results imply that higher growth enhances F.D.I. due to capital intensity and the advancedw 
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technologies in developed countries. Due to good infrastructure, the coefficient of the var-
iable Tele is also positive and significant. The coefficient for Pop is highly significant and 
positively associated with F.D.I. inflows. Lagged F.D.I. has a highly significant and positive 
impact on F.D.I. inflows. Our result findings imply that previous years’ F.D.I. inflows have a 
highly positive and significant impact in attracting F.D.I. inflows. As expected, the financial 
crises have significant and negative impacts on F.D.I. inflows. W.T.O. membership has a 
positive but insignificant impact in our specified O.L.S. model.
In accordance with the literature of endogeneity, we have a potential bias within our 
O.L.S. results (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer, 2007; Buchanan et al., 2012; Daude & 
Stein, 2007; Hall & Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995). Countries are not exogenously gifted with 
institutions that promote good governance; in fact, the governance is determined endog-
enously, depending on the type of law that governs the country, the legal origins, and the 
level of economic development (Buchanan et al., 2012).
According to Wooldridge (2000), I.V. methods are used to provide better modelling 
results. Buchanan et al. (2012), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and Daude and Stein 
(2007) all used I.V. methodology in their research analyses. Staiger and Stock (1994) for-
malised the definition of ‘weak instruments’, and most researchers seem to have concluded 
from that work that if the F-statistic for the excluded instruments in the first stage is greater 
than 10, there is no further need to worry about weak instruments. Stock and Yogo (2005), 
using a rule of thumb, go into more detail and provide a more rigorous statistical method, 
developing the critical value for the F-statistic in the first-stage regression.
Column (4) reports the I.V. results using the legal origins as instruments (U.K., French, 
and German origins). Result findings show that Gov has a positive but insignificant impact 
on F.D.I. inflows. The correlation between governance and I.V.s is explained in Appendix 
2(a). Furthermore, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity shows an insignificant 
p-value (0.4911), proving the existence of exogeneity.
La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) found that countries that follow 
English common law protect foreign investors and stakeholders better, strongly secure 
property rights, and boost the confidence of foreign investors and market regulations; as a 
result, they attract more F.D.I. inflows. Previous literature notes that English common law 
makes capital markets stronger, more developed, and more conducive to investment. On 
the other hand, civil law is associated with complex and longer proceedings, dishonesty, 
unfairness, and more incentives for corruption. La Porta et al. (1998) show that English 
common law countries have more market capitalisation per G.D.P. relative to civil law 
countries. Column (7) reports the I.V. results using common law and the lagged values 
of the independent variables as instruments. A one standard deviation change in the Gov 
variable improves F.D.I. by a factor of 0.2225. Furthermore, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test 
for the endogeneity of governance variable shows a significant p-value (0.0018), rejecting 
the hypothesis of consistent O.L.S. estimates and proving the existence of endogeneity. As 
a result, we report both O.L.S. and I.V. estimates. G.D.P.P.C.G., Pop, and Lagged F.D.I. have 
highly significant and positive impacts on F.D.I. inflows. W.T.O. membership has a negative 
and significant impact on F.D.I. inflows. The financial crises are insignificantly but negatively 
associated with F.D.I. inflows as well as infrastructure, as a consequence of the inclusion of 
the transition economies in the developed countries panel.
The coefficients of Gov, G.D.P.P.C.G., and market size have positive and highly significant 
impacts on F.D.I. inflows. Columns (8) and (9) report the I.V. results using common law 
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and lagged values of independent variables as instruments; the results show that individual 
governance indicators, such as C.C. and R.L., have positive and highly significant impacts 
on F.D.I. inflows. Our result findings in columns (8) and (9) are highly robust with the 
result findings of column (7), i.e., that governance has a positive and highly significant 
impact on F.D.I. inflows.
4.2. Developing countries
In Table 3(b), the simple O.L.S. regression results with F.D.I. as the dependent variable 
in column (1) show that Gov has a positive and significant effect on F.D.I. inflows. The 
statistical results imply that governance indicators matter in attracting F.D.I. G.D.P.P.C.G., 
infrastructure, market size, and Lagged F.D.I. have positive and highly significant impacts 
on F.D.I. inflows. From our results, we infer that the financial crises have similar effects in 
both developed and developing countries, i.e., decrease F.D.I. inflows. W.T.O. membership 
has a positive but insignificant impact on F.D.I. inflows in our specified O.L.S. model.
In accordance with the literature on endogeneity, we have a potential bias within our 
O.L.S. results (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Buchanan et al., 2012; Daude & Stein, 2007; Hall 
& Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995).
Column (4) reports the I.V. results using legal origins as instruments. Governance has an 
insignificant impact on F.D.I. inflows. The correlation between governance and the I.V.s is 
explained in Appendix 2(b). Furthermore, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity 
of governance shows an insignificant p-value (0.3813), proving the existence of exogeneity.
Column (7) reports the I.V. results using common law and the lagged values of independ-
ent variables as instruments. Our findings show that governance has an insignificant impact 
on F.D.I. Furthermore, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for the endogeneity of governance, 
with a significant p-value (0.0052), rejects the hypothesis of consistent O.L.S. estimates and 
proves the existence of endogeneity.
The control variables Pop and Lagged F.D.I. positively and significantly affect F.D.I. 
inflows, while Tele, Financial Crises, and W.T.O. have negative and insignificant effects on 
F.D.I. inflows. G.D.P.P.C.G. is positively but insignificantly associated with F.D.I. inflows. 
Columns (8) and (9) report the I.V. results using common law and lagged values of inde-
pendent variables as instruments; the findings show that individual governance indicators, 
such as C.C. and R.L., insignificantly impact F.D.I. inflows. Our findings in columns (8) and 
(9) are highly robust with the findings of column (7), i.e., that governance has an insignifi-
cant impact on F.D.I. inflows in developing economies because of weak control of corruption 
and the high instability associated with R.L., as our result findings show that individual 
governance indicators, such as C.C. and R.L., are insignificant in developing economies.
We can infer from the statistical findings that institutions in developing countries are 
not strong enough to work well with other types of law and legal origins to attract F.D.I. 
5. Conclusions
This paper has examined the impact of institutional quality on F.D.I. using panel data for 
110 countries from 2002 to 2012. For both developed and developing countries, the results 
indicate that G.D.P.P.C.G., infrastructure, market size, and Lagged F.D.I. significantly affect 
F.D.I. In contrast, W.T.O. membership has insignificant effects in attracting F.D.I. inflows. 
As expected, the financial crises have significant and negative impacts on F.D.I. inflows for 
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both developed and developing countries. In the case of developed countries, we find that 
governance has a positive effect on F.D.I., i.e., a one standard deviation change in governance 
significantly affects F.D.I. by a factor of 0.2225 (using common law and the lagged values 
of the independent variables as instruments). Further, the findings regarding individual 
governance indicators are highly robust; governance as an aggregate component shows a 
positive and significant impact on F.D.I. inflows, stressing that strong C.C. and the stability 
of R.L. are important governance indicators to attract F.D.I. inflows. In the case of developing 
countries, governance fails to attract F.D.I. due to the exogeneity issue because of poor C.C. 
and R.L. instability, i.e., institutions should be strong enough to work endogenously well 
with other types of law and macroeconomic factors to provide economic growth.
The results for developed countries regarding the impact of governance on F.D.I. are 
robust when using different econometric techniques, which implies that F.D.I. inflows can be 
increased by improving the institutional framework and providing a good macroeconomic 
environment. The results for the developed countries are in accordance with the empiri-
cal growth literature, which stresses the importance of institutions for economic growth 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Hall & Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Stasavage, 2002). 
Due to the poor governance and exogeneity issues, we fail to find a relationship between 
governance and F.D.I. for developing countries in line with the previous literature (Harms & 
Ursprung, 2002; Ju & Wei, 2007; Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). From our findings, we infer that 
governance indicators tend to be a key point in attracting F.D.I. inflows and are thus relevant.
Apart from a few exceptions, in our data-set of developed and developing countries, 
when the C.C. and R.L. had a negative sign, it was followed by governance with the exact 
same unfavourable behaviour. When financial crises occur, some countries in the developed 
group tend to lower their C.C. and increase in R.L. instability and thus, in the case of Greece 
and Croatia, the signs of these variables became negative over the considered period.
Even though many scholars emphasise the importance of geographical, psychic, and 
cultural distances as important determinants of F.D.I. (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003, 
2004; Eren & Jimenez, 2015; McCallum, 1995), unfortunately, we could not find complete 
bilateral data for the entire sample of countries, and we consider this as a limitation of our 
study; however, it would be really interesting to measure the impact of governance on F.D.I. 
inflows by adding the gravity model to future research.
From our findings, we can formulate policy implications that stress the role of key gov-
ernance indicators, such as C.C. and R.L., as important determinants in attracting F.D.I. 
inflows in both developed and developing countries. Developing economies are highly 
dependent on F.D.I. inflows and foreign capital accumulation. Without improving govern-
ance (C.C. and R.L.), it will be very hard to attract F.D.I. inflows in developing countries, 
which will hinder economic development because international investors and multinational 
companies always consider important governance indicators while investing in developing 
economies. In sum, key governance indicators play an extremely important role in attracting 
F.D.I. inflows and economic development for both developed and developing economies.
Notes
1.  According to the World Bank, the base year varies by country.
2.  Data and Metadata Reporting and Presentation Handbook (Ward, 2007).
3.  http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/
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Appendix 1(a). List of developed and transitioning economies.
No. Country Code No. Country Code
1 albania aLB 22 japan jPn
2 armenia aRm 23 kazakhstan kaZ
3 australia aUs 24 kyrgyz Republic kGZ
4 austria aUt 25 Luxembourg LUX
5 azerbaijan aZE 26 macedonia, FYR mkD
6 Belarus BLR 27 moldova mDa
7 Belgium BEL 28 netherlands nLD
8 Bulgaria BGR 29 new Zealand nZL
9 canada can 30 norway noR
10 croatia hRv 31 Poland PoL
11 czech Republic cZE 32 Portugal PRt
12 Denmark Dnk 33 Romania Rom
13 Estonia Est 34 Russian Federation RUs
14 Finland Fin 35 spain EsP
15 France FRa 36 sweden sWE
16 Georgia GEo 37 switzerland chE
17 Germany DEU 38 tajikistan tjk
18 Greece GRc 39 Ukraine UkR
19 iceland isL 40 United kingdom GBR
20 ireland iRL 41 United states Usa
21 italy ita      
source: Un, World Economic situation and Prospects, 2014.
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Appendix 1(b). List of developing countries, least-developed countries, and 
small island developing states.
No. Country Code No. Country Code
1 algeria DZa 36 Lao PDR Lao
2 antigua and Barbuda atG 37 Lesotho Lso
3 Bahamas, the Bhs 38 macao saR, china mac
4 Bangladesh BGD 39 malaysia mYs
5 Barbados BRB 40 mauritania mRt
6 Bolivia BoL 41 mauritius mUs
s7 Botswana BWa 42 mexico mEX
8 Brazil BRa 43 mongolia mnG
9 Brunei Darussalam BRn 44 morocco maR
10 Burundi BDi 45 mozambique moZ
11 cabo verde cPv 46 nicaragua nic
12 cameroon cmR 47 niger nER
13 china chn 48 nigeria nGa
14 colombia coL 49 Pakistan Pak
15 costa Rica cRi 50 Panama Pan
16 Dominica Dma 51 Paraguay PRY
17 Dominican Republic Dom 52 Peru PER
18 Ecuador EcU 53 Philippines PhL
19 Egypt, arab Rep. EGY 54 Rwanda RWa
20 El salvador sLv 55 sao tome and Principe stP
21 Ethiopia Eth 56 senegal sEn
22 Fiji Fji 57 singapore sGP
23 Gabon GaB 58 south africa ZaF
24 Ghana Gha 59 sri Lanka Lka
25 Grenada GRD 60 st. Lucia Lca
26 Guatemala Gtm 61 st. vincent and the Grenadines vct
27 Guinea-Bissau GnB 62 sudan sDn
28 haiti hti 63 tanzania tZa
29 honduras hnD 64 thailand tha
30 hong kong saR, china hkG 65 tunisia tUn
31 india inD 66 turkey tUR
32 indonesia iDn 67 Uruguay URY
33 jordan joR 68 vanuatu vUt
34 kenya kEn 69 vietnam vnm
35 korea, Rep. koR      
source: Un, World Economic situation and Prospects, 2014.
Appendix 2(a). Correlations between governance and instrument variables – 
developed countries.
  Gov legor_uk legor_fr legor_ge comlaw
gov 1.0000
legor_uk 0.3772 1.0000
legor_fr 0.1994 -0.2039 1.0000
legor_ge 0.2784 -0.1361 -0.1619 1.0000
comlaw 0.3772 1.0000 -0.2039 -0.1361 1.0000
notes: legor_uk: U.k. legal origin; legor_fr: French legal origin; legor_ge: German legal origin; comlaw: common law.
source: author calculation.
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Appendix 2(b). Correlations between governance and instrument variables – 
developing countries.
  Gov legor_uk legor_fr legor_ge comlaw
Gov 1.0000
legor_uk 0.3903 1.0000
legor_fr -0.3463 -0.8609 1.0000
legor_ge 0.1403 -0.0943 -0.1343 1.0000
comlaw 0.3985 0.4321 -0.3720 -0.0407 1.0000
notes: legor_uk: U.k. legal origin; legor_fr: French legal origin; legor_ge: German legal origin; comlaw: common law.
source: author calculation.
